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Crumpler: Constitutional Law - Legislative Chaplaincy Program Held Not to V

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE
CHAPLAINCY
PROGRAM HELD NOT TO VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE-Marsh v. Chambers, - U.S. _,

103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983).
INTRODUCTION

The Establishment of Religion Clause declares, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."' Since
Everson v. Board of Education,2 the Supreme Court has given the
Establishment Clause a broad interpretation. The interpretation
has not, however, developed without some confusion. At times the
Court and some individual justices have argued that there must be
a complete separation between religion and government.4 In other
cases the Court has taken the position that the Establishment
Clause does not require total disassociation between church and
state.' There has been much scholarly dissatisfaction with some of
the Court's applications of the Establishment Clause," and a great
deal of public outrage generated by some of the individual
decisions.7
The majority of cases addressing the Establishment Clause
have dealt with the questions of state aid to religiously affiliated
schools' and religious activities in public schools.9 The question of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.

2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Id. at 15.
4. 330 U.S. at 15-16; 330 U.S. at 52-53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
5. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 746
(1976).
6. See, e.g., Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 ViL. L. REv. 3, 9-11
(1979), in which the author contends that the framers never intended the Establishment Clause to apply to the states.
7. For a discussion of the public reaction to the School Prayer decisions, see
P. KURLAND, The School Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE 142-46 (D. Oak ed. 1963).
8. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971);
Committee For Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Wolman v.
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the constitutionality of legislative chaplains has essentially gone
unaddressed. The Supreme Court recently ventured into this uncharted wilderness, when, in Marsh v. Chambers, ° the Court ruled
that a Nebraska legislative chaplaincy program did not violate the
Establishment Clause. In addition to being the first Supreme
Court case dealing with legislative chaplains, Marsh also marked a
departure from the Court's usual method of Establishment Clause
analysis.
THE CASE

Rule one, sections two and twenty-one, of the Rules of the Nebraska Unicameral requires the Nebraska legislature to select a
chaplain to open each legislative session with an invocation. Since
1965 the sole chaplain had been one particular Presbyterian minister. The State paid the chaplain $320 per month for each month
the legislature was in session. In addition, the legislature expended
several hundred dollars to print several hundred copies of compilations of the prayers. The books were distributed to members and
non-members of the legislature. Senator Chambers, a member of
the legislature, brought an action claiming the Establishment
Clause prohibited the compensation to the chaplain, the printing
of the prayer books, and the invocations themselves."
The district court considered the three claims to be severable,
and upheld the invocations. 12 The court, however, said that compensating the chaplain had the effect of advancing religion, and
that the funding for the printing of the prayer books had no secular purpose' s and were each a violation of the Establishment
Clause. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part, saying the district court erred by not considering
the practice as a whole, 4 and that under such an analysis the entire program was unconstitutional. 5 Petitioners accepted the district court's ruling regarding the printing of the prayer books' 6 and
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
10.

-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir. 1982).
Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585, 589-591 (D. Neb. 1980).
Id. at 591.
Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 233 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 235.
Marsh v. Chambers, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3332 n.3 (1983).

U.S.

-,

103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
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appealed only that part of the court of appeals decision holding
that opening the legislative sessions with a prayer by a state paid
chaplain violated the Establishment Clause.1 7 The Supreme Court
in a six-to-three decision reversed, holding that such a practice was
not violative of the Establishment Clause. 8
BACKGROUND

The freedom to believe or disbelieve any religious doctrine is,
for the most part, unquestioned in present-day America. But, this
freedom does not spring from the earliest days of the first colonists. 19 Many of the early settlors journeyed to the New World to
achieve a measure of religious freedom unattainable in Europe,
which had state sponsored religions. The settlors, however, proved
to be as intolerant of religious dissenters and nonconformists as
the leaders of the countries they left. Religious dissenters were
punished or banished from the colonial settlements. Also, all the
colonists were required to contribute to the support of the established church.20 Such establishment of religious orthodoxy and
churches was more common than not.2' Finally, as a result of the
persistence of crusaders like Roger Williams, the concept of government non-interference with religion began to take hold in the
colonies. Gradually, toleration of dissenters became accepted and
support of religion and the churches passed from the state to the
followers. 2
The events of 1785, within the Virginia colony, are viewed as
one of the historic first steps in the disentanglement of government
from religion. Patrick Henry had introduced a bill in the Virginia
legislature that would impose taxes to support the Christian religion. James Madison, in his persuasive Memorial and Remonstrance, argued that religious affairs were properly beyond the purview of government and that the proposed tax would violate the
right to support the religion of one's choice. Henry's bill was defeated. 23 The result was the adoption of Thomas Jefferson's A Bill
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 3332.
Id.
P.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3337.
KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 100 (1956).

at
at
at
at

101.
102-103.
103.
104.
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for EstablishingReligious Freedom, 24 which stated that every man
should be free to worship as he sees fit and that no one should be
compelled
to support any religion or engage in any religious activ25
ity. The events in Virginia had a profound effect on similar devel-

opments in other states and in the adoption of the First Amendment religion clauses.2 6
In-depth consideration of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court began with the case of Everson v. Board of Education.2 7 The Court enunciated a broad "no aid to religion" policy,
decreeing that government must be neutral toward religion, neither
hindering nor advancing it.2 8 Despite this statement, the court held

that the aid, bus fare reimbursements to parents of children attending parochial schools, was not prohibited by the Establish0 the Court softened the
ment Clause.29 In Zorach v. Clausons
harsh "no aid" rhetoric of Everson by upholding a New York practice of dismissing pupils early from school so they could attend religious classes off the school grounds.3 1 The Court felt that neutrality demanded some accomodations by the government to religion,
and that such accomodations did not violate the Establishment
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia (1823) 84.
KAUPER, supra note 19, at 104.
Id. at 105.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).

The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16.
29. Id. at 17.
30. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
31. Id. at 315.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol6/iss1/7
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Clause.3 2 However, there was still no clear standard to guide either
the Supreme Court itself or lower courts in deciding Establishment
Clause problems.
In Abington School District v. Schempp, 3 the Court, for the
first time, expressly stated a test for deciding Establishment
Clause issues." To pass constitutional muster, the law must have a
secular purpose and its primary effect must neither advance nor
inhibit religion." In addition to the two-part test, the Court continued to stress neutrality as a vital factor in analyzing Establishment Clause questions, stating "a wholesome neutrality" was essential." Furthermore, the Court refused to equate neutrality with
promoting secularism. 8 7 In Walz v. Tax Commission,"3 the Court
applied a refinement of the two-part test developed in Schempp,
adding to the primary effect part of the test the requirement that
an act not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. In essence, the Court seemed to equate excessive entanglement with primary effect.3 9 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, ° the Court set
the excessive entanglement factor apart as a separate element of
the test, resulting in a three-pronged analysis. 1 The three-pronged
test is the most elaborate and highly-developed guide for deciding
Establishment Clause questions. Though some individual justices
have expressed dissatisfaction with some facets of the standard, 2
it has been affirmed by subsequent decisions. 3
To pass the first part of the Lemon test, the law or act in
32. Id. at 314-15.
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. Though not expressly articulated, the Court seemed to implicitly use the

same test in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
35. 374 U.S. at 222.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 225.
38. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

39. Id. at 674.
40. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

41. Id. at 613.
42. Justice White concurring in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board,
426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976), would eliminate the entanglement test and use only the
purpose and effect tests. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part
in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265 (1977), would scrap the three-part standard altogether and adhere to the strict "no aid" dictates of Everson.
43. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Committee For Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 358 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
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question must have a secular legislative purpose." In deciding
whether this requirement is met, the stated purpose of the legislature is considered. However, the courts are not foreclosed from further scrutiny merely because the legislature says the law in question is for the achievement of a legitimate secular goal.45 Yet in
application the Supreme Court has, for the most part, routinely
upheld the stated legislative purpose as secular. ' The reason for
such deference would appear to be the Court's desire to avoid as
much direct confrontation with the state legislatures as possible.47
Since violation of any of the three parts of the test voids the questioned practice, the Court, when confronted with an objectionable
law or act, can void it because of the manner in which it was carried out, rather than because it was done for an impermissible purpose. Nevertheless, the Court has occasionally voided legislation on
the basis of a finding of no secular purpose.4" Also, the Court, on
one occassion, held that if a law presently has a legitimate secular
purpose, the fact that it was originally enacted for religious reasons
49
does not result in a violation of the secular purpose test.
Under the second part of the Lemon test, the law or act must
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 0
Primary effect does not necessarily mean the law's single most important result. The Court has stated that even if the primary effect is to promote a legitimate secular goal, the act can still be examined to see if its direct and immediate effect is one that
advances or inhibits religion.5 1 In Tilton v. Richardson, 2 the Court
held that the mere possibility that academic facilities built with
44. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
45. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
46. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-682 (1971); Committee
For Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Committee For Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1980); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741-42 (1973).
47. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative
Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1179-1180 (1974).
48. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39, 41-42 (1980).
49. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
50. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682 (1971).
51. Committee For Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n. 39
(1973).
52. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol6/iss1/7
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government funds might be used for religious purposes after the
expiration of the government's twenty year interest, violated the
primary effect test, and required the inspection period to be extended indefinitely. 3 However, not all aid to religious institutions
will violate the primary effect test. The Court has made this clear
by suggestions in dicta that social services such as fire and police
protection can be provided to them. 5" Also, the Court has stated
that the primary effect test is not violated merely because aid frees
up other funds or resources that could be used for religious purposes. 5 An important factor in deciding if the effect test has been
breached is the pervasiveness of religion in the benefited institution. The Supreme Court has said:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed
in the religious missions or when it funds a specifically religious
activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting."
However, if a distinction can be established between secular and
non-secular functions, then aid may be allowed to further the secular activity. 7
To clear the final Lemon hurdle, the law or act under review
must not cause an excessive entanglement between government
and religion.58 The Court has adopted the position that religion
59
and government need not be completely separate in all instances.
Rather, "the test is inescapably one of degree." 60 There are primarily four factors to examine in deciding whether the degree of entanglement is excessive.
The first factor is the resulting relationship (caused by the
statute) between government and religion.6 The most important
53. Id. at 683-84.
54. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970).
55. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 679 (1971).
56. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
57. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).
58. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-85 (1971).
59. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970); Roemer v.
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976).
60. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
61. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
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consideration appears to be insuring that the aid does not entail
62
government surveillance of religious institutions and activities.
Surveillance is not only viewed as an evil in itself, but in some
instances also presents the potential danger of government direction of religious institutions. 3
The second factor to consider is the character and purposes of
the benefited institution. 4 This factor seems quite similar to the
"pervasiveness of religion standard" the Court uses in analyzing
the primary effect of the practice in question.6" One commentator
has suggested that with regard to the character and purposes of
the institution and the resulting relationship between government
and religion, the Court is engaging in mere subjective speculation
and paying little attention to the factual record.66 For example, the
Court considered parochial schools in Lemon 7 to be of a more religious nature than religiously affiliated colleges in Tilton 6 and Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board69 despite the fact that evidence in Lemon showed that the teachers had not injected religion
into secular subjects.70
The third factor is the nature of the aid provided.7 1 Prior
Court decisions indicate that aid which can be screened for religious content or use, such as textbooks 72 and buildings 7 3 is more
74
likely to be approved than outright grants of money.
The risk of political division along religious lines is the fourth
62. See id. at 619. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), shows how important this consideration can be in the Court's decisions. In that case the Court
upheld certain provisions of the aid package to non-public schools (e.g. the supplying and scoring of standardized tests and the providing of therapeutic services
to students) partly on the basis that no government surveillance would be required, while voiding funds for field trips because such supervision would be required to make sure none of the funds were spent for religious teaching.
63. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
64. Id. at 615.
65. See, e.g., id. at 616.
66. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of The Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195, 1216-18 (1980).
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
69. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
70. Ripple, supra note 66, at 1217.
71. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
72. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
73. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
74. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol6/iss1/7
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factor to consider. 5 As the Court said in Lemon, for most issues
such division would be perfectly acceptable. However, political division along religious lines is a danger the Establishment Clause
was designed to prevent. Otherwise people may make political decisions based on religious belief rather than on analysis of the issues.7 6 The Court has taken the position that annual funding appropriations are more likely to cause a danger of such divisiveness
than one-time funding, due to the repeated confrontations between
supporters and opponents of the aid.7
Excessive entanglement is not only a danger itself but has become an early-warning device, indicating when an act or law is
close to violating the Establishment Clause.7 This part of the test
is useful as a signal because excessive entanglement does not have
to actually exist for an act or law to be constitutionally void. In
Lemon the mere possibility that the salary supplements would go
to teachers who might advance religion in the classroom would require government surveillance, which would in turn result in excessive church-state entanglement, which made the act unconstitutional. 9 Consequently, the excessive entanglement test may
become a means of avoiding church-state conflicts before they
arise. 8°
In addition to the three-prong test enunicated in Lemon, neutrality has continued to be an important consideration.8 1 The government must maintain a "wholesome neutrality" toward religion,82 neither favoring one sect over another nor religion in
general over non-religion. 8 While the command of neutrality does
not mean church and state must be completely separate, it does
require that there be no concert of action between them.8
Although there have been some references to various types of
government-funded chaplaincy programs in some Supreme Court
75. Id. at 621.
76. Id.
77. Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975), with Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
78. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
79. Id. at 619.
80. Ripple, supra note 66, at 1215.
81. See, e.g., Committee For Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788
(1973); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
83. See, e.g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 219 (1963);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
84. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
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cases,8 5 prior to Marsh no Supreme Court decision had ever directly concerned chaplains of any kind. The few state and lower
federal court cases dealing with chaplains are, therefore, important
to consider in analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh.
The Supreme Court has said that although all religions and
sects need not be provided with equal facilities and religious personnel, the Free Exercise Clause requires that all prison inmates
be given reasonable opportunities to practice their religious beliefs.86 Courts which have been asked whether state provided chaplains are constitutional have answered in the affirmative.87 The
contention that state-funded prison chaplains violate the First
Amendment ignores the requirement of balancing the Free Exercise Clause with the Establishment Clause. 8 The Court in Theriault v. Carlson" upheld state-supported prison chaplains, following the reasoning of Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurrence in
Schempp. 90 Brennan felt that since the government had taken
away the inmates' privilege of worshiping when and where they desired, an argument could be made that the government could, consistent with the Establishment Clause, provide chaplains to prison
inmates so as not to violate the Free Exercise Clause.91
The Court in Carlson also made the observation that prison
officials must tend to the emotional and spiritual needs of all prisoners, and that it would be impossible to have a chaplain for each
religion or sect. A representative selection must therefore be provided.92 Thus, apparently with regard to prison chaplains, and
probably military chaplains as well, neutrality demands can be
relaxed.
85. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 441 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Abing-

ton School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-300 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
86. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
87. Horn v. People of California, 321 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Calif. 1968), aff'd,
436 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1977); Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 871 (1977), reh. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977); Remmers v. Brewer,
361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd., 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1976).
88. See, e.g., Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 127-28 (Iowa 1976).
89. 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
90. Id. at 381.
91. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
92. 339 F. Supp. at 380.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol6/iss1/7
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Legislative or quasi-legislative chaplains have been challenged
in four cases. In Lincoln v. Page9 3 guest clergyman were invited to
give an invocation before the commencement of local town board
meetings. The prayers were not composed by any government official and the ministers received no compensation. The persons invited to give the prayers were rotated.9 4 The New Hampshire Supreme Court failed to apply the purpose and effect test, which was
the standard in effect at that time, and instead simply held that
the facts failed to show an Establishment Clause violation.9 5 Although acknowledging that even minor infringements on the Establishment Clause could not be tolerated, the Court nevertheless
found that the infringement complained of was not blatant and
had a long history of acceptance. This seemed to be the basis for
the decision upholding the constitutionality of the town board
invocations. 6
A somewhat more in-depth analysis of the issue appears in the
case of Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General27 In Colo, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court was asked to rule on the state legislature's practice of compensating chaplains for both the state Senate and House. The chaplains gave a brief prayer before each daily
legislative session. For twenty years the same Catholic priest had
functioned as the Senate's chaplain. In the House the same Catholic priest had presided as chaplain for twenty-four years. The
chaplains received $9500 and $7800 per year respectively. 8 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court applied the Lemon three-prong establishment of religion test and upheld the compensation." The
court said the invocations had a secular purpose as they helped the
legislators solemnly reflect on the duties they were about to perform. 10 0 The primary effect was held not to be religious, even
though the court admitted the prayers were religious in nature.
The court distinguished mature adults, who were not likely to be
influenced by the prayers, from impressionable children in a classroom, who might feel bound to follow what is being taught, and
determined that no religious belief was being advanced by the leg93. 109 N.H. 30, 241 A.2d 799 (1968).
94. 241 A.2d at 800.
95. Id. at 801.

96. Id. at 800.
97. 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979).
98. 392 N.E.2d at 1196.
99. Id. at 1200.
100. Id.
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islative invocations. 10 1 Additionally, the court found no excessive
entanglement because no government supervision was required'0 2
and there was no evidence of political division along religious
lines. 10 3 The court in Colo seemed to have overlooked the fact that
political divisiveness does not have to be real. The potential for
political divisiveness seems to be enough to strike a practice on
entanglement grounds.104 Also, the court apparently ignored the
command that government not favor one religion or sect over
another.
In Bogen v. Doty'0 5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with a county board of commissioners' practice of having local clergymen open their meetings with an invocation. No compensation was paid, but only Christian clergymen had been invited to
participate in the program. 0 6 The Court of Appeals ruled that the
practice had a secular purpose in that an air of solemnity was
thereby created. 07 The appellate court held that although the invocations might have some religious effect, the primary effect was
to establish a solemn atmosphere for the meetings.'0 8 As for excessive entanglement, the fact that there was no annual funding
seemed to persuade the Court that no risk of political division
along religious lines existed, and, therefore, this part of the test
was not violated. 0 9 Although upholding the practice, the Court of
Appeals sternly warned the Board that the practice came very
close to violating the Establishment Clause. If for example, the
Board denied clergyman of other faiths an opportunity to participate, the court said this would present an Establishment Clause
problem since the Board would thereby effectively be giving preference to one religion over another." 0
In Marsa v. Wernik,"' the New Jersey Supreme Court took an
innovative approach to a challenge of a town council's practice of
having a member of the Council give an invocation prior to the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1201.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971).
598 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113-14.
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id.
86 N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (1981).
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meetings. The court felt that the excessive entanglement test was
unnecessary in cases where the government was directly involved
is
since, if there is a religious purpose or effect, the government 112
necessarily entangled with religion due to its direct involvement.
The court held that the purpose of the practice'was not religious,
but rather was to achieve an air of solemnity." 8 The court also
held that the primary effect of the practice did not advance religion. 14 In coming to this conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme
Court relied on several characteristics of the practice, including:
(1) the fact that the content of the prayers was not plainly religious; (2) the fact that prayers served a legitimate secular purpose;
(3) the fact that there was no official government support of the
prayers, which were instead the statements of individuals; (4) the
fact the prayers were not directed at impressionable children; and
(5) the long history of acceptance the practice enjoyed." 5 However,
the court, like the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bogen,
warned the Council that if there should be a more express government endorsement of the content of the prayers or if the prayers
were to become more religiously1 6oriented, there could be serious
Establishment Clause problems.
ANALYSIS

The majority in Marsh held that the Nebraska legislature's
practice of opening sessions with prayers by a state-employed
chaplain did not offend the Establishment Clause." 7 In reaching
this conclusion, however, the Court abandoned express use of the
Lemon three-prong test and ignored formerly well-settled principles of neutrality.
The Court made no attempt to expressly apply the threeprong standard to the case. Instead, the Court relied on an historical examination of legislative chaplaincy programs." The Court
noted that such prayers had received widespread acceptance since
colonial times.1' 9 In particular, the Court focused on the fact that
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

430 A.2d at 894.
Id. at 896.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 900.

117.

-

U.S. at

-,

103 S. Ct. at 3337.

118. Id. at 3332-36.
119. Id. at 3333.
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three days prior to Congressional approval of the Bill of Rights,
Congress approved the appointment of paid legislative chaplains.
The Cburt felt this clearly showed that such legislative chaplaincy
programs were not considered by the framers as violative of the
Establishment Clause.120 While acknowledging that a constitutional violation does not become constitutionally acceptable as a
result of long-term use, the Court nevertheless stated that " . . .
an unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast
aside.' ' 21 The majority obviously considered that due to their longevity, legislative chaplaincy programs were entitled to such deference,122 and that generally such programs were not in violation of
the Establishment Clause. 2 '
The Court then examined the specific features of the Nebraska program and held that no part of the program created an
Establishment Clause violation. The Court held that the long-term
relationship with a single minister of a particular denomination did
not result in the advancement of the beliefs of that particular
church.'2 ' The majority felt that the fact that compensation was
paid to the minister did not create a violation, due to the longterm practice of paying such chaplains. 25 The Court concluded its
inquiry into the Nebraska practice by holding that where there was
no evidence of any attempt to advance any religious belief through
the prayers, the content of the prayers was not properly subject to
judicial scrutiny and content could not be used to void the
practice. 2 6
Justice Brennan, relying in his dissent on the Lemon threeprong standard, 2 7 said that the Nebraska practice violated all
three parts of the test. Regarding secular purpose, Brennan refused
to even acknowledge that the invocations might have the secular
purpose of establishing a solemn atmosphere prior to the legislative sessions. 2 8 As for primary effect, he felt the legislative prayers
were clearly religious, tending to put the power and prestige of the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

3333-34.
3334, quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
3335.
3336.

3337.
3338.
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state behind a particular religious belief. 12 9 Finally, Brennan felt
that the excessive entanglement prong was violated due to the possibilities of required government surveillance over the chaplain and
political division along religious lines. 130
Justice Stevens' brief dissent focused on the contention that
the State's long-term association with one particular minister of
one particular denomination showed a preference for one religion
over another.' 1
By holding that the framers did not intend to prohibit legislative prayers, the Court is in effect approving those lower court decisions which have held that such invocations are not per se unconstitutional. In light of the actions of the framers regarding
legislative chaplaincies, such a conclusion may be both rational and
justified. 82 However, the Court's holding that this particular chaplaincy program was constitutional is irreconcilable with previous
interpretations of the Establishment Clause and has the potential
for throwing Establishment Clause analysis into chaos.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent,' 33 if the Lemon
three-prong standard and its present interpretation had been expressly employed, the Nebraska practice would have certainly been
ruled unconstitutional. The Court could have said that the purpose
of the prayers was to achieve a solemn atmosphere before the legislative sessions. In this way the Court could have granted the legislature a large measure of the deference usually accorded such bodies inEstablishment Clause cases as well as recognized that some
forms of "ceremonial prayers" do not offend the Establishment
Clause. Nonetheless, the Nebraska practice would have still violated the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs of the
Lemon test. Due to the long-term relationship between the State
and the single minister employed, the "direct and immediate", if
not the primary effect gives preference to the religious beliefs of a
specific denomination or sect. Because of the use of state funds to
compensate a chaplain who enjoyed such a special relationship
129. Id. at 3339.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 3351-52.
132. But see Choper, The Religion Clauses of The First Amendment: Reconciling The Conflict, 41 Pirr. L. REV. 673, 676-77 (1980), in which the author suggests that in attempting to analyze the Establishment Clause, it might be unwise
to place too much emphasis on the intent of the framers, because a literal following of this intent might jeopardize values held important today.
133.

-

U.S. at

-,

103 S. Ct. at 3338.
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with the state, there was a risk of political division along religious
lines; thus, the excessive entanglement test was violated. .
Considering the Court's recent reaffirmation of the threeprong standard in Mueller v. Allen, 4 there is a clear possibility
that the Court's failure to expressly utilize the three-prong standard in Marsh is the result of a premeditated decision by the
Court to reach a desired result regardless of prior -precedent. It
could be argued, however, that while the Court did not expressly
use the Lemon standard, the Court did implicitly employ the
three-prong standard in the Marsh case. After looking at the historical background of such chaplaincy programs, the Court appears
to implicitly conclude that they have a secular purpose. 135 The
court then states:
The Court of Appeals was concerned that Palmer's long tenure
has the effect of giving preference to his religious views. We, no
more than Members of the Congresses of this century, can perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination advanced the beliefs of a particular church. 3
This statement is a direct refutation of the holding of the court of
appeals that the primary effect prong of the test was violated due
7
to the long-term relationship with the one particular minister.13
Thus, the Court is strongly implying that there is no violation of
the primary effect prong. The Court then holds that the program is
not violated by the fact that public funds are used to compensate
the chaplain. 18s This statement overturns the court of appeals'
holding that payments of government funds to a minister who enjoyed such a long-term relationship with the state resulted in the
potential for political division along religious lines and, thus, violated the excessive entanglement prong.1 3 9 Thus, once again the
Court implicitly holds that one of the prongs of the test was not
violated. In essence, the Court seems to have employed the Lemon
three-prong test without ever having explicitly said so. There is
134.

-

U.S.

-,

103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).

135. "In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society." - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at
3336.
136.

-

U.S. at

-,

103 S. Ct. at 3336..

137. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234 (1982).
138.

-

U.S. at

_,

103 S. Ct. at 3336..

139. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 235 (1982).
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nothing inherently wrong with this mode of analysis. The Court
may of course adopt new methods of analysis or discard old methods as its seems fit. Furthermore, the Court may overrule an entire
line of cases interpreting a constitutional principle. It is surprising,
however, that after many years of express utilization of the Lemon
standard in Establishment Clause cases, the Court would, without
explanation, suddenly refrain from utilizing it in Marsh. The Court
undoubtedly realized that an attempt to justify the holding on the
basis of previous interpretations of the three-prong standard could
not withstand close scrutiny. Thus, rather than call attention to
the inconsistency of the decision with previous cases, the Court
chose to base the holding on an historical analysis coupled with
unsupported conclusions regarding the act's primary effect and potential for excessive entanglement.
Although the rationale behind the Court's method of analysis
may be confusing, the result of the decision is fairly clear. In
Marsh the court has greatly relaxed the interpretation and application of the Lemon standard and, thus, created an atmosphere
regarding Establishment Clause cases which is more favorable toward religion. Litigants can forcefully argue that Marsh stands for
the proposition that the primary effect prong is not breached
merely because of a special "arrangement" between the government and one sect or denomination. It could also be argued that
Marsh holds that payment of public funds to one sect or denomination does not violate the excessive entanglement prong.
The Court's opinion appears to blatantly disregard the wellestablished principle of "wholesome neutrality." Clearly by allowing Nebraska to maintain this special relationship with the representative of one particular denomination, the Court has condoned the favoring of one sect over another. Although as
previously pointed out, such a relationship might be acceptable for
prison and military chaplaincy programs,"10 there were no facts
present in Marsh to justify ignoring neutrality concepts. Clearly
Nebraska has placed the power and prestige of the state behind
one particular denomination, and the Supreme Court has accepted
this as non-violative of the Establishment Clause. This not only
adversely affects the "touchstone" of neutrality, but may also have
major implications on the future evolution of the secular purpose
and primary effect prongs of the Lemon standard. One commentator has suggested that the Court has for some time equated neu140. See p. 152 infra.
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trality with the purpose and effect prongs."' If this is so, then this
relaxation of neutrality standards may, in the near future, result in
significant changes in the results reached through application of
the secular purpose and primary effect prongs.
Another result in Marsh is the increased difficulty in predicting how the Court will rule in Establishment Clause cases. While
the Court has hardly been a model of consistency in deciding Establishment Clause issues, the Lemon standard coupled with neutrality principles did give the area some predictability. The failure
to expressly use the three-prong standard, the apparent alteration
of the interpretation of the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs, and the deviation from well-settled principles of neutrality will all work to make preparation and argument of Establishment Clause cases more difficult.
CONCLUSION

Marsh held that a Nebraska legislative chaplaincy program
did not offend the Establishment Clause even though the State
had employed the same chaplain for almost twenty years. Instead
of expressly employing the Lemon three-prong standard ordinarily
used for Establishment Clause analysis, the Court embarked on an
historical examination of the intent of the framers toward such
programs. Also, the Court appeared to implicitly utilize the Lemon
standard. This opinion is not only a startling departure from the
usual method of analysis, but is also totally inconsistent with the
wholesome neutrality dictates of numerous prior decisions.
Due to the long-term relationship between the State and the
minister, the three-prong standard and neutrality considerations
would seem to compel a different result. The holding in effect insulates virtually all legislative chaplaincy programs from Establishment Clause attack. Despite the Court's previous assertion that it
could not approve the slightest breach in the wall separating
church and state,1 4 the holding that the program was constitutional may not be as important as the Court's method of analysis.
The holding not only will result in some confusion as to the mode
of analysis being employed by the Court, but may also be used to
inject more religious beliefs into society. It is conceivable that the
Court could someday use the principles laid down in Marsh to
overturn the School Prayer cases. However, considering the Court's
141. 24

WAYNE

L.

REV.

1103, 1108 (1978).

142. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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blatant disregard of precedent in analyzing the Marsh, case, it can
be hoped that the Court will also ignore the Marsh holding when
considering future Establishment Clause cases.
M. Greg Crumpler
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